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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ALBANY
______________________________________________
In the Matter of the Application of
,

Amended Verified Petition

Petitioner,
-againstTINA M. STANFORD,
CHAIRWOMAN, NEW YORK STATE
BOARD OF PAROLE,

Index No.
Oral Argument Requested

Respondent.
For Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
______________________________________________
The Petition of
1. Petitioner

respectfully alleges that:
, currently incarcerated at Wende Correctional Facility brings

this petition for a judgment pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking to annul respondent’s
November 10, 2020 denial of parole and directing the Parole Board to conduct a de novo
parole review.
2. Undersigned counsel did not represent

in preparation for the November 10,

2020 parole review at issue here, nor in the administrative appeal, which
filed pro se.
3. Respondent, New York State Parole Board [hereinafter the “Board”], has not provided
petitioner with the full record of the proceedings below, specifically the full parole file
relied on by the Board in denying parole. Therefore, the facts alleged herein are based
upon the limited portions of the parole file that the Board has provided to

.
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4. Petitioner requests that the Board, as part of its answer to this petition, file with this Court
and serve on petitioner all records, documents and material provided to the Board for the
November 10, 2020 parole review.
5. The Parole Board’s denial of parole was improper for four reasons:
a. The Board departed from

low COMPAS risk scores without

providing individualized reasons for doing so;
b. The Board considered, referred to, and placed weight upon the sentencing judge
and prosecutor’s penal philosophy expressed at
recommended

sentencing, which

never be considered for release on parole;

c. The Board’s repeated focus on the high profile nature of the underlying case as well
as the parole decision at issue prevented the Board from considering the relevant
statutory factors and thus the decision was predetermined; and
d. Parole commissioner W. William Smith did not consider granting
release to parole supervision based on his personal beliefs.
6. Based on the facts and law, the denial of parole was arbitrary, capricious and irrational
constituting an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the Court should vacate the Board’s
improper denial of parole to

and grant a de novo parole review. See

Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition.
JURISDICTION
7. Article 78 confers jurisdiction over this matter upon this Court. CPLR §§ 306-b, 307 (2),
and 7804(c).
8. This Court has ruled that Petitioner established personal jurisdiction over Respondent.
NYSEF Doc. No. 34.
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9. Petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the
administrative determinations of the Board.
10. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter because the Board’s denial of
appeal cannot be further “reviewed by appeal to a court or to some other body of officer.”
CPLR § 7801(1).
VENUE
11. This action is properly commenced in Albany County because it is the county in which the
New York State Parole Board has its principal office. CPLR § 506(b).
PARTIES
A. Petitioner
12.

, fifty-five years old, has been imprisoned for over thirty-three years. He
was denied parole on November 10, 2020.

B. Respondent
13. Tina Stanford is the Chairwoman of the New York State Board of Parole.
14. The Board of Parole is the sole entity that considers and determines parole eligibility, sets
conditions of release, and revokes parole when the conditions are violated.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
15. Parole Commissioners Smith and Coppola denied parole to Petitioner

on

November 10, 2020, after an interview conducted at Wende Correctional Facility via
videoconference on the same date. Ex. 1.
16.

filed, pro se, a timely notice of administrative appeal.

then

perfected his appeal pro se on February 24, 2021. Respondent received it March 2, 2021;
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thus, the appeal was timely. Respondents denied

pro se appeal in a

decision dated June 10, 2021. Ex. 9.
17.

has exhausted his administrative remedies and this matter is ripe for the
instant Article 78 proceeding. 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c); Ex. 9.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon and murder in

18. In 1989,

the second degree for the murder of New York City Police Officer
He was sentenced to a custodial term of twenty-five years to life.

in 1988.
first

became eligible for parole in 2012.
19.

was age twenty-two at the time of the crime; he had no prior criminal
convictions.

20.

has been denied parole five times, serving eight years beyond the minimum
sentence of twenty-five years.

21.

has a positive disciplinary record, having only received five tickets, all but
one within the first ten years of his incarceration. Ex. 3.

22. The Board conceded during the interview at issue that

has a good

disciplinary record and acknowledged that the most recent ticket was “small,” and that the
last violent ticket he had was back in 1990, over three decades ago. Ex. 1 at 15, 16, 17
(“your disciplinary record is good... while you’ve been inside you’ve been doing well”).
23. Respondent’s risk assessment instrument, COMPAS, scored

low in eleven

of twelve categories. Ex. 4.
24. While incarcerated,

acquired a GED and engaged in significant

programming, including extensive work in the law library. Ex. 7; Ex. 5. He has started
teaching a legal research class to his peers. He has attended braille classes. See Ex. 6 at 1.
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25.

completed programs in printing, appliance repair, teaching, and legal
research law library management. Ex. 7 at 8-11.

26.

has received high marks in his work progress reports. One report notes
“[b]ecause

is such a good worker, RMU staff calls upon him a lot when the

building is short porters,” while another states that in the Soap Factory “[h]is work ethic is
commendable and his relationship with staff and other offenders is excellent.” Ex. 5; Ex.
7.
27.

successfully completed a 100-hour Aggression Replacement Training and
has received certificates of completion for a Nonviolent Conflict Resolution program from
the Alternatives to Violence Project, Inc., and a 70-hour course in Basic Legal Research
and Law Library Management. Ex. 6 at 1–2.

28. While incarcerated,

has counseled young men convicted of crimes on how

to improve their lives through education and hard work. Ex. 1 at 18.
29. If released, he intends to use his experience to continue mentoring young people to help
them avoid taking the path he did as a young person, and to become productive members
of society. Id.
30.

ability to work diligently towards his goals is reflected in the letters of
recommendation he received from correctional staff members who have worked with him
daily for extended periods of time and in progress reports detailing the high quality of his
work. See Ex. 7.

31.

strives to stay out of trouble and continue to “better [him]self,” regardless of
when he is released. See Ex. 1 at 19.
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32. The Commissioners at the November 10, 2020 interview remarked that “things are bad”
inside, making it that much more difficult to stay on track. See Ex. 1 at 18. Nevertheless,
has done so.
33.

contracted COVID-19, for which he was hospitalized. In the November,
2020 interview he thanked the medical providers and acknowledged that the nurse who
cared for him “saved [his] life.” See Ex. 1 at 16, 20 (“you have to thank God and the first
responders and everybody that participated in making sure that you were all right”).

34. If granted parole,

will seek to transfer parole to either New Jersey where one

sister lives, or North Carolina, where his other sister lives. He plans to earn a living using
the skills he acquired through training programs while incarcerated and seeks to live a quiet
life. See Ex. 2 at 21-23.
35. Board commissioners Marc Coppola and W. William Smith conducted the interview and
rendered the denial decision on November 10, 2020. The transcript of the interview is
attached as Ex. 1.
36. The Board’s decision, issued on November 10, 2020, reads as follows:
“After a review of the record, interview and deliberation, the panel has
determined that your release would be incompatible with the welfare and
safety of society and would be [sic] so deprecate the serious nature of the
crime as to undermine respect for the law. Parole is denied
Required statutory factors have been considered, together with your
institutional adjustment, including discipline and program participation, your
Risk and Needs Assessment and your needs for successful reentry into the
community. Also considered are letters of support for your release and letters
or statements opposed. More compelling however, are the following: Your
serious IOs of murder second and CPW second degrees which involved you
and your co-defendants causing the death of a police officer, officer
, while he sat in his patrol car. It is stated in the record that this act was
committed as retaliation against law enforcement form a drug dealing
organization and it’s [sic] leader. In fact, a further aggravating factor is that
Officer
was guarding the home of a witness because of this
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organization, one that you admit being a part of. Members of this organization
have attempted to intimidate the witness due to his complaints about drug
activity around his home. Therefore this crime represented an attack not only
on Officer
, but the rule of law as a whole. While the IOs appear to be
your only felony convictions of record and this is your only state term of
incarceration, it in no way mitigates the role that you played in committing
this terrible crime.
The panel notes your positive programming and relatively clean disciplinary
record since 2000, despite your Tier II ticket March of this year However,
discretionary release shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct
or efficient performance of duties while confined. Also weighed and
considered are the results of your Risk and Needs Assessment and the low
scores indicated therein. As discussed during your interview, your claim of
innocence was also considered. However, the panel does not intent [sic] to,
nor have the authority to, undermine the jury’s verdict. In playing a role in
the murder of Officer
you demonstrated a callous disregard for human
life and a complete lack of respect for the law.
Therefore based on all required factors, in the file considered, discretionary
release at this time, is not appropriate.”
Ex. 1.
The Board Failed to Adequately Explain Its Departure From Low COMPAS Scores
37.

had low COMPAS scores in eleven out of twelve categories. Ex. 4 at 2. As
to risk of “felony violence,” “arrest risk” and “abscond risk,”

had the lowest

score of “1” on a scale of one to ten. Id.
38. As to “prison misconduct,” which was scored high, the Board stated the score should not
have been high. Ex. 1 at 24 (Commissioner Coppola: “I think it’s obvious that your
misconduct is not high.”).
39. Despite these low, positive scores, the Board, in denying parole, claimed that release at this
time would be incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the
seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect for the law. The Board, however, failed
to either specify the scales from which it was departing or provide individualized reasons
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from such departures, both of which the law requires. See Argument I, Memorandum in
Support of Petition.
The Board Considered and Relied on Penal Philosophy
40. The murder of Police Officer

conviction, and

parole eligibility has elicited overwhelming attention and strong opinions from the
sentencing judge, the trial prosecutor, victim representatives, the law enforcement
community, and the media.
41. In 1989, when

was sentenced, the law did not permit the sentencing judge

to impose life without parole.
42. At sentence, the judge and prosecutor criticized the law’s proscription of this sentence and
recommended that future parole boards never consider releasing

.

At

sentencing, the prosecutor and judge expressed their staunch beliefs that the law should
allow for a sentence of life without parole in response to the crime for which
was convicted. To remedy this, both recommended that future parole boards never
consider release. Ex. 10.
43. At sentence, the trial prosecutor lamented that

could not be sentenced to life

without parole or death:
… unfortunately at the present time unlike 40 other states, New York does not have
a death penalty, nor do we have life without parole. However, we are going to ask
the Court at this time to impose the sentence of the maximum the law allows, and
we would ask that the Court, as part of its sentencing recommendation, to
recommend that this defendant never be paroled or walk the streets as a free man.
Id. at 3–4.
44. The sentencing judge then expressed his dismay that the law restricted him from sentencing
to life without parole:
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Now I have received a multitude of letters asking that I impose a life sentence
without parole, and under our law, I cannot do that. However, what I can and will
do is to promise you that I intend to make a recommendation to the parole board
that you are never to be paroled. I know I will no longer be sitting on the bench
twenty-five years from now, but rest assured, my last judicial function before I
retire from the judiciary will be to write to the parole board to remind them of my
strong feeling that I have expressed to you today.
Ex. 10 at 7.
45. Like the prosecutor, the sentencing judge recommended to the Board that it follow his
personal penal philosophy: to impose life without parole by never considering release to
parole supervision.
46. At the November 10, 2020 interview, the Board directly referenced the sentencing court’s
expression of penal philosophy:
“I’ll be honest with you, you know, and I know in sentencing minutes, he said
[referring to the judge] – they [referring to the judge and prosecutor] talked about
the death penalty. He said that you should never be released and his last day in
office, he was going to make sure he wrote to the parole board.”
Ex. 1 at 12.
47. The parole file contains additional recommendations by the trial prosecutor and sentencing
judge, that likely contain additional expressions of penal philosophy. Ex. 8 (indicating
“official statements” from the “DA” and “JUDGE” are in the parole file).
48. The New York City Police Benevolent Association (“PBA”) has an established campaign
with resources dedicated to opposing the release of individuals convicted of killing police
officers.
49. This PBA campaign asserts that all people who are convicted of killing police officers
should never be released.
50. The PBA’s website permits anyone to fill in a form to be sent to the Board opposing the
release of “cop killers.”
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51. On information and belief,

parole file likely contains thousands of these

PBA forms.
52. On information and belief, the parole file contains “significant opposition” expressing
penal philosophy. Ex. 1 at 24, 28 (the Board stating the parole “file is huge, [sic] we have
a lot of information.”); Ex. 14 at 17 (In 2015, the Board referred to “thousands” of letters—
namely “letters from judges, DAs, U.S. attorneys, police officers, politicians, mayors,
senators, thousands of police officers and citizens.”).
53. The Board relied on and gave weight to the opposition material that expressed personal
opinions and penal philosophy which is not permitted. See Argument II, Memorandum in
Support of Petition.
The Board’s Focus on the High-Profile Nature of the Case Pre-Determined the Decision
54. The Board twice referred to the high-profile nature of the case during the instant November
10, 2020 interview.
55. The first such reference occurs near the beginning of the hearing:
: …as you know it’s a political case.
COMMISSIONER COPPOLA: It’s a highly charged media case, there’s no doubt
about that.
Ex. 1 at 7.
56. Then, near the end of the interview, Commissioner Coppola, unprompted, injects the public
profile of

case:

COMMISSIONER COPPOLA: We all have a bad day. When you go 20 years
without anything, I think that’s a different story. So with that low family support,
everything is low and unlikely. Of course this doesn’t take in other factors with
regard to the crime but it does take in a number of other factors, your age, things
like that. Your healthy [sic] might play a role in there. I’m trying to cover the areas
that I wanted to cover. Again, there are—you’re not the only one but there are other
cases that whether they’re high profile or not. Your case is what we would consider
for lack of a better term high profile and this is not a secret. You have support for
your release and significant opposition.
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: I understand that.
COMMISSIONER COPPOLA: It’s never been a secret for you…
Ex. 1 at 24.
57. When

was convicted, it was headline news. Since

first

became eligible for parole in 2012, intense media coverage of his case has resumed leading
up to and following each parole review.
58. At

first parole review, in 2012, a commissioner spoke at length about the

widespread attention

case received:

COMMISSIONER ELOVICH: Now, in addition to the family, there is also a
tremendous amount of opposition from law enforcement who felt a tremendous
amount of loss, not only in the City of New York at the time, but across the entire
nation. This was the most highly attended funeral for a police officer in the whole
nation. People came to this funeral from other countries, all ethe elected officials
were there, community members, people from local elementary schools, this case
had a tremendous impact on the entire nation, and still from the letters of opposition
continues to have a tremendous impact on law enforcement and many members of
New York City, including all of the officials who remember this case and the way
that it completely shocked and terrified members of the community.
: Yes, ma’am.
Ex. 13 at 10.
59. In 2017, the Board returned to the subject of the “extremely high profile” nature of Mr.
s case. Ex. 15 at 19. The Board questioned

about the possibility

that negative sentiments held by law enforcement, and the related media attention directed
towards

case, would make it harder for him to function as a productive

member of society:
COMMISSIONER BERLINER: Let’s say we parole you and you go back
the
community,
right?
to
: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER BERLINER: This is an extremely high-profile case.
: Yes.
COMMISSIONER BERLINER: Regardless of what happens with your
judicial appeal process and your maintenance of innocence.
: Yes, sir.
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COMMISSIONER BERLINER: It’s not a secret that the police department
is absolutely opposed to the release of anybody who is convicted of killing
a cop.
: I understand.
COMMISSIONER BERLINER: So we talked about your plan to go back
to the community. We talked about your readiness to go back to the
community, but I want to get a sense from you of your confidence level of
being able to integrate back into a community that seems like it might be
incredibly hostile to you.
Ex. 15 at 19.
60. Taken together, the repeated emphasis on the public profile of

case in the

2020 interview and past interviews strongly indicates that the denial was predetermined.
See Argument III, Memorandum in Support of Petition.
Commissioner Smith Did Not Consider the Possibility of Release to Parole Supervision
61. Commissioner Smith, who recently left the Board, was the longest serving Commissioner
on the Parole Board at the time of

hearing.

62. Commissioner Smith was appointed by Governor Pataki in 1996.
63. Governor Pataki, first inaugurated in 1995, campaigned on a promise to reinstate the death
penalty, and three months after taking office, signed legislation authorizing the death
penalty and life without parole.
64. Commissioner Smith has strong ties to state Senator Patrick Gallivan who avidly opposes
the release of people convicted of killing police officers.
65. Before being elected to the state senate, Senator Gallivan was also appointed to the Parole
Board by Governor Pataki and served on the Board with Mr. Smith for a number of years.
66. Commissioner Smith has supported the candidacy of Senator Gallivan by donating to
Senator Gallivan’s election and reelection campaigns at least eight times since 2010.
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67. Senator Gallivan has been an outspoken critic of granting parole to those convicted of
murdering police officers, demonstrated by multiple campaigns opposing the release of socalled “cop killers.”
68. When

—who was convicted of killing two police officers—was released on

parole, Sen. Gallivan sent a letter to the Governor questioning the legitimacy of the Board’s
decision and requested an investigation into the Board’s decision-making practices. See
Patrick M. Gallivan, Letter to Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, July 29, 2019, available at
https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/pressrelease/attachment/gallivan_parole_letter_2019.pdf.
69. Senator Gallivan rallied against the release of

, who, in 1971 at age 19,

killed a police officer and had served over 45 years on a 25 to life sentence. Press Release,
Senator Gallivan Calls On Parole Board to Deny Parole for Convicted Cop Killer,
https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/patrick-m-gallivan/senator-gallivancalls-parole-board-deny-parole-convitced.
70. Senator Gallivan expressed the same position in a series of press conferences urging the
Parole Board to deny parole to

. He presented a petition to the Board “signed

by nearly 10,000 concerned citizens” urging them “to deny the release from prison of
, the driver of a getaway car in a 1981 robbery of a Brink’s armored car in Rockland
County, N.Y. The robbery left a security guard and two police officers dead.” Patrick
Gallivan, Senator Gallivan Presents Petition Calling on NYS Board of Parole to Deny
Release of Judith Clark, 29 March 2018, https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/patrick-m-gallivan/senator-gallivan-presents-petition-calling-nys-board.
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71. Senator Gallivan keeps a close watch on the Board’s decisions, particularly those in the
cases of so-called “cop killers.” Just this past June, he noted that “[s]ince 2017, the state
Parole Board has released at least 20 cop-killers.” Patrick Gallivan, Senator Gallivan Joins
Colleagues in Unveiling Parole Reform Bills, https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/patrick-m-gallivan/senator-gallivan-joins-colleagues-unveiling-parole-reform.
72. Commissioner Smith’s sustained support for a politician who continuously fights to block
the release of “cop-killers” suggests that he supports that political position as well.
73. Upon information and belief, Commissioner Smith has never voted to grant parole to a
person convicted of killing a police officer.
74. Commissioner Smith’s refusal to consider parole for those convicted of killing police
officers is illustrated by his participation in the last two denials of parole to
each violating a court order.
75.

, convicted of murdering a police officer, successfully appealed his 2014
denial of parole, with the court finding the Board had relied exclusively on the severity of
the offense. See Mackenzie v. Stanford, No. 2789/2015, 2015 WL 13872810, at 3 (Sup.
Ct., Dutchess Cnty, 2015). The court ordered a de novo review to be conducted in
compliance with the law.

76. At the 2015 de novo appearance, the panel, which included Commissioner Smith, issued
a denial decision. Ex. 22 at 1.
77.

moved for contempt. The Art. 78 court held the Board in contempt finding
that the Board had once again denied parole based solely on the nature of the crime. See
MacKenzie v. Stanford, No. 2789/2015, 2016 WL 11690588, at 3 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty,
2016), aff’d, Ferrante v. Stanford, 172 A.D.3d 31 (2d Dept 2019).
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78. The court ordered a second de novo review and ordered that “none of the members of either
the 2014 or 2015 parole boards that denied parole shall participate in the DE
NOVO

hearing,” which included Commissioner Smith. MacKenzie, No. 2789/2015 at *3

79. In violation of the court’s order Commissioner Smith sat as lead on what was now a second
de novo review that took place in 2016. Ex. 21, at 1.
80. At the 2016 review, Commissioner Smith again denied release based solely on the nature
of the crime. Id. at 31
81. Ten days later,
82. In 2019,

, then 70 years old, was found dead by suicide.
was denied parole. He was convicted of killing a police officer and a

civilian when he was eighteen years old, had served over 40 years, and been denied parole
five times. Ex. 16 at 2–3. After filing an Art. 78 challenging the legality the denial, the
court granted the petition, ordered a de novo review, and found, among other reasons, that
the Board denied solely based on the seriousness of the crimes. Id. at 7
83. At

2020 de novo review, two out of the three commissioners on the penal

voted to grant parole. The two commissioners noted that “[t]he opposition of your release
was duly considered” but nevertheless granted his parole “[b]ased on the legal standards
this panel must apply.” Ex. 12 at 81–82. Commissioner Smith, however, dissented stating,
“[t]he senseless deaths of the two men you shot and killed continue to impact the victims’
family, friends and the community.” Ex. 12 at 83.
84. On October 20, 2015, Commissioner Smith denied parole to a person convicted of
murdering a police officer. See, e.g., “Parole Interview Transcript/Decision - FUSL000002
(2015-10-20)" (2019). Parole Information Project https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/trans/6.
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85. On December 15, 2015, Commissioner Smith denied parole to a person convicted of
murdering a police officer. Parole Interview Transcript/Decision - FUSL000069 (2015-1215)" (2021). Parole Information Project https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/trans/102.
86. On July 28, 2016, Commissioner Smith denied parole to a person convicted of murdering
a police officer and reads into the record at the interview the words of the sentencing judge:
“There probably is no crime in our society that society condemns more than the killing of
a policeman in the performance of his duties.”). "Parole Interview Transcript/Decision FUSL000069

(2016-07-28)"

(2021).

Parole

Information

Project

https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/trans/103.
87. On May 16, 2012, Commissioner Smith denied parole to a person convicted of murder and
attempted murder of a police officer.
FUSL000077

(2012-05-16)"

"Parole Interview Transcript/Decision -

(2021).

Parole

Information

Project

https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/trans/118.
88. Commissioner Smith did not consider releasing

to parole supervision based

on his personal opposition to granting parole to persons convicted of killing police officers.
See Argument IV, Memorandum in Support of Petition.

CAUSE OF ACTION:
ARTICLE 78 REVIEW OF IMPROPER DENIAL OF PAROLE
(For Judgment Pursuant to CPLR §§ 7801-7806 and Executive Law §259-i(c)(a)(2))
89. Petitioner repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the preceding
paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
90. Article 78 is the appropriate method of review of final agency determinations concerning
parole reviews.
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91. The Board’s November 10, 2020 denial decision violated its statutory and regulatory duties
in four ways.
92. First, the Board functionally departed from
scores by denying him parole.

across the board low COMPAS

This departure required the Board to provide an

individualized reason for each such departure. The Board’s citation to the nature of the
crime does not meet the requirement.
93. Second, the Board improperly considered, referenced, and placed weight upon penal
philosophy, a factor specifically delineated as improper by the Court of Appeals. .
94. Third, the interview transcript indicates that the Board improperly considered the highprofile nature of

case and public pressure to deny him parole. The Board’s

decision was thus predetermined, and an abdication of its duty to give genuine
consideration to the statutory factors articulated in Executive Law §259-i(c)(a)(2) when
making a parole determination.
95. Fourth, Commissioner Walter William Smith’s known political ties and past voting record
evince a personal belief that no person convicted of killing a police officer should ever be
released from prison. Commissioner Smith, one of a two-judge panel, based his decision
on his own personal belief, rendering the decision improper.
96. Petitioner has exhausted administrative remedies and has no other remedy at law.
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
In light of the above errors, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment,
pursuant to CPLR 7806, and:
a. vacate the Board’s November 10, 2020 denial of parole;
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b. grant a de novo parole review before a different Board panel than that which presided at
the November 10, 2021 interview and at the June 10, 2021 denial of the administrative
appeal, and that such take place within 30 days of this order;
c. order Respondents, as part of the answer to this petition, to file with this Court and serve
on Petitioner all records and all victim impact statements provided to the Board for the
November 10, 2020 parole review; and
d. grant Petitioner such other and further relief as this Court deems necessary and equitable.
Dated: New York, New York
December 13, 2021

______________________
Martha Rayner, Esq.
Clinical Associate Professor of law
mrayner@lsls.fordham.edu
Lincoln Square Legal Services
Fordham University School of Law
150 West 62nd Street, 9th Floor
New York, New York 10023
(212) 636-6934
On the Petition:
Dean Corrado
Eli Salamon-Abrams
Isabel Zeitz-Moskin
Legal Interns
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ALBANY
_____________________________________
In the Matter of the Application of
,
Petitioner,
-againstTINA M. STANFORD,
CHAIRWOMAN, NEW YORK STATE
BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent

ATTORNEY VERIFICATION

Index No.

For Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
_____________________________________

Martha Rayner, an attorney duly admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of
New York, affirms the following to be true under penalties of perjury:
I am Of Counsel to Lincoln Square Legal Services, Fordham University School of Law’s clinical
law office, and counsel for Petitioner.
I have read the foregoing Petition and know the contents thereof and the same are true
to my knowledge, except those matters therein which are stated to be alleged upon information
and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true. My belief, as to those matters
therein not stated upon knowledge, is based upon facts, records, and other pertinent information
contained in my files.
I make the foregoing affirmation pursuant to CPLR 3020(d)(3) because Petitioner is not
in the County where I have my office.
Dated: December 13, 2021

Martha Rayner, Esq.
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STATEMENT PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.8-B
I, Martha Rayner, affirm under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106, that the total
number of words in the foregoing Amended Petition, inclusive of point headings and footnotes
and exclusive of pages containing the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, and signature
block, is 4843 words. The foregoing Memorandum of Law complies with the word count limit set
forth in 22 NYCRR 202.8-b. In determining the number of words in the foregoing Memorandum
of Law, I relied upon the word count of the word-processing system used to prepare the document.

/s/ Martha Rayner_______________
MARTHA RAYNER
Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ALBANY
______________________________________________
In the Matter of the Application of
,
Petitioner,
-against-

Memorandum of Law
In Support of Petition

TINA M. STANFORD,

Index No.

CHAIRWOMAN, NEW YORK STATE
BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.
For Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
______________________________________________

Martha Rayner, Esq.
Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc.
Fordham University School of Law
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Board Failed to Explain It’s Departure from Low COMPAS Scores
A. The Board’s Denial Decision Departed from Low COMPAS scores.
When the Board’s denial decision “departs” from COMPAS scores, the Board is required
to “specify any scale within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment from which it departed
and provide an individualized reason for such departure.” See 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a). 1

The

requirement to provide such reasoning is not dependent on the Board’s admission of “departure,”
or use of the word “depart” in the decision; it is enough that the denial contradicts or is inconsistent
with low COMPAS scores. See Ex. 19 at 4 (Phillips v. Stanford (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. 2019))
(finding low COMPAS risk and needs scores “directly contradicted” the Board’s finding that
discretionary release would not be incompatible with the welfare of society, and thus the Board
was “required to articulate with specificity the particular scores in petitioner’s COMPAS
assessment from which it was departing and provide an individualized reason for such
departures”); Ex. 18 at 4 (Miranda v. N.Y. State Parole Bd. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2020)) (finding
that the Board “needs to explain, with particularity, its reasons for departing from a risk-assessment
analysis” when the Board denied parole despite low risk COMPAS scores); Ex. 17 at 11 (Hill v.
New York State Bd. Of Parole (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2020)) (holding that the Board’s denial, which

“Risk and Needs Principles: In making a release determination, the Board shall be guided by risk and needs
principles, including the inmate's risk and needs scores as generated by a periodically-validated risk assessment
instrument, if prepared by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (collectively, "Department
Risk and Needs Assessment"). If a Board determination, denying release, departs from the Department Risk and
Needs Assessment's scores, the Board shall specify any scale within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment
from which it departed and provide an individualized reason for such departure. If other risk and need assessments
or evaluations are prepared to assist in determining the inmate's treatment, release plan, or risk of reoffending, and
such assessments or evaluations are made available for review at the time of the interview, the Board may consider
these as well.”2 Unpublished County Supreme Court decisions are provided as exhibits as indicated.
1
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did not include the word “depart,” nor acknowledge departure from low COMPAS scores, required
the Board to “articulate the reasons for this determination with respect to Mr. Hill's low COMPAS
Risks and Needs Assessment scores or to ‘provide an individualized reason for this departure,’ in
accordance with 9 NYCRR 8002.2”). 2 Here, the Board’s decision to deny parole despite low
COMPAS scores amounted to a functional departure.
had low COMPAS scores in eleven out of twelve categories. Ex. 4 at 2. As
to risk of “felony violence,” “arrest risk” and “abscond risk,”

scored the lowest of

“1” on a scale of one to ten. Id. As to “prison misconduct, which was the only high score, the
Board stated the score should not have been high. Ex. 1 at 24 (Commissioner Coppola: “I think
it’s obvious that your misconduct is not high.”).
Despite these scores, the Board concluded that release at would be incompatible with the
welfare of society and would so deprecate the seriousness of his offense as to undermine respect
for the law; therefore, the Board’s decision departed from the COMPAS scores. Ex. 12 at 5–6
(Voii v. Stanford (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. 2020) (rejecting as “flawed” the Board’s argument that
it need not explain its departure because it did not depart from a finding that the petitioner was
likely to reoffend, only that petitioner’s release was incompatible with the welfare of society and
would deprecate the seriousness of the offense, and reiterating that the law “clearly indicates that
a departure requires the Board to identify any scale from which it departs and provide an
individualized reason” for the departure) (emphasis in original); Ex. 20 at 1 (Robinson v. Stanford
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. 2019)) (finding the Board’s denial citing to incompatibility with the
welfare of society, “directly contradicts these scores in [petitioner’s] COMPAS assessment,”
which were “the lowest possible rating in categories for risk of felony violence, re-arrest,

2

Unpublished County Supreme Court decisions are provided as exhibits as indicated.
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absconding and for criminal involvement,”; Ex. 17 at 1 (Hill) (finding that the Board had an
obligation to explain departure from low COMPAS score when denial was based on the conclusion
that “Mr. Hill would not live and remain at liberty without again violating the law and Mr. Hill's
release would be incompatible with the welfare of society, and would so deprecate the serious
nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law.”) Therefore, the Board cannot evade the
obligations of the regulation even though the denial here did not rely on the standard of a
reasonable probability of reoffending in denying parole. Ex. 12 at 1 (Voii) (referring to the
standards of incompatibility with social welfare and deprecate the seriousness of the offense so as
to undermine respect for the law, the Voii court found: “[t]he fact that Respondent Board here
relied upon the other two standards in denying release does not excuse the Board’s from complying
with 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(a).”)
B. The Board’s Citation to the Nature of the Crime Does Not Meet Its Obligation to
Provide an Individualized Reason for Departure from Low COMPAS Scores
Since the basis for the Board’s decision was inconsistent with the low COMPAS scores,
the Board was required to “specify any scale within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment
from which it departed and provide an individualized reason for such departure.” 9 NYCCRR §
8002.2(a). Yet, the only basis for denial cited by the Board was the nature of the crime, which is
not a sufficient reason for departure from across-the-board low COMPAS scores. Ex. 12 at 5–6
(Voii). In Voii, all the COMPAS scores were low, yet the Board denied parole finding that release
would be incompatible with the welfare of society and would deprecate the seriousness of the
crime so as to undermine respect for the law. Id. at 4–5. The Voii court held that the Board’s
reason for departure, which was the nature of the crime, was “unrelated to any score contained in
the COMPAS assessment,” and held that “judicial intervention is warranted because this departure
from the regulations evinces irrationality bordering on impropriety.” Id. at 6–7.
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The same is true here.

scored low in 11 of 12 categories and the Board stated

he should have scored low in the one category he did not, yet the Board denied based on a finding
that release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and would deprecate the seriousness
of the crime so as to undermine respect for the law. Ex. 1 at 30. The only reason given for this
conclusion was the nature of the crime. Ex. 1 at 30–31. As in Voii, the Board’s citation to the
nature of the crime does not explain the denial’s inconsistency with low COMPAS scores because
“…the departure is unrelated to any scale contained in the COMPAS Assessment.” Ex. 12 at 6–7
(Voii). In addition, the Board’s perfunctory mention of the statutory factors does not meet the
requirement to specify the particular scale from which it departed and provide an individualized
reason for such departure. See Ex. 20 at 2 (Robinson) (finding that the Board’s denial of parole
departed from petitioner’s low COMPAS scores and: “The Board's conclusory statement that it
considered statutory factors, including petitioner's risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts and
needs for successful community reentry to the community in finding that discretionary release
would not be compatible with the welfare of society fails to meet this [9 NYCCRR § 8002.2(a)]
standard.”)
The Board’s failure to adhere to its own regulation is sufficient to grant a de novo review.
Ex. 12 at 2 (Voii); Ex 20. At 2 (Robinson).
II.

The Parole Board Unlawfully Considered, Referred to and Placed Weight Upon
Penal Philosophy Expressed by the Sentencing Judge and Prosecutor
The Board must not consider political or personal beliefs, their own or others’, as to the

appropriate punishment for any particular crime in considering whether a person should be paroled
under the standards and factors the law dictates. See In re King v. New York State Div. of Parole,
83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994) (holding that “penal philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals
convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to
6
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society if those sentences are not in place” may not be considered because each factor is outside
the scope of Executive Law § 259-i); N.Y Exec. Law § 259-i. Here, the Board, in denying release
to parole supervision for the fifth time considered, referenced and placed weight upon penal
philosophy that asserted

should never be considered for release to parole supervision

because he was convicted of killing a police officer.
A. The Trial Prosecutor and Sentencing Judge’s Recommendations to the Parole
Board were Pure Expressions of Penal Philosophy.
Penal philosophy is one’s individual belief as to the appropriate moral, philosophical or
criminological response to certain crimes—essentially one’s personal sense of what is a just
response to those who engage in criminal conduct. The Board, however, is obligated to consider
the law as the correct measure of what “society” by way of the legislature has deemed the
appropriate response to those convicted of criminal conduct. In 1989 when

was

sentenced, the law did not permit imposition of the death penalty or life without parole. At
sentencing, however, the prosecutor and judge expressed their staunch beliefs that the law should
allow for a sentence of life without parole in response to the crime for which

was

convicted. To remedy this, both recommended that future parole boards never consider release.
The trial prosecutor lamented that

could not be sentenced to life without

parole:
… unfortunately at the present time unlike 40 other states, New York does not have a death
penalty, nor do we have life without parole. However, we are going to ask the Court at this
time to impose the sentence of the maximum the law allows, and we would ask that the
Court, as part of its sentencing recommendation, to recommend that this defendant never
be paroled or walk the streets as a free man.
Ex. 10 at 3–4. The prosecutor’s statements sought to achieve that which the law did not permit —
imposition of the death penalty or at the very least life without parole.
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The sentencing judge then expressed his dismay that the law restricted him from sentencing
to life without parole:
Now I have received a multitude of letters asking that I impose a life sentence without
parole, and under our law, I cannot do that. However, what I can and will do is to promise
you that I intend to make a recommendation to the parole board that you are never to be
paroled. I know I will no longer be sitting on the bench twenty-five years from now, but
rest assured, my last judicial function before I retire from the judiciary will be to write to
the parole board to remind them of my strong feeling that I have expressed to you today.
Ex. 10 at 5, 7. Like the prosecutor, the judge recommended to the Board that they follow his
personal penal philosophy: to impose life without parole by never considering release to parole
supervision.
These are pure expressions of penal philosophy, in direct conflict with the law since Mr.
s sentence requires the Board to genuinely consider parole every time

is

eligible. The First Department in King explained “penal philosophy” by stating,
Commissioner Burke's extensive remarks at the hearing demonstrate that the Board was
proceeding on the assumption that its primary duty was to determine, in the abstract, the
appropriate penalty for murder in today's society. Indeed, Commissioner Burke's remarks
made quite clear his belief that his own personal attitudes toward the propriety of punishing
murder with the death penalty or with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
had some relevance to the question of how long petitioner should spend in prison. It is, in
fact, difficult to avoid the inference that Commissioner Burke felt some regret that
petitioner had not been executed, thereby eliminating the dilemma caused by his
rehabilitation, and that he considered petitioner's rehabilitation to be a dilemma for the very
reason that he believed that petitioner should not be eligible for parole. Since neither the
death penalty nor life imprisonment without the possibility of parole are part of the law of
this state, they should clearly not have entered into the Board's consideration.
King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245, 251 (1993), aff'd, 632 N.E.2d 1277
(1994). Like the commissioner in King, the sentencing judge and prosecutor expressed regret that
could not be given a harsher sentence; this was their personal sense of the
appropriate penalty for the crime of conviction.
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B. Penal Philosophy Expressed by the Trial Prosecutor and Sentencing Judge in the
Sentencing Transcript was Considered and Weighed by the Board
The Board explicitly considered this penal philosophy. First, the sentencing judge and
prosecutor expressed their penal philosophy as recommendations to the Board, and the Board is
required to consider a recommendation by the sentencing court and prosecutor. See N.Y. Exec.
Law § 259-i (c)(A)(vii). Second, the Board directly referenced the sentencing court’s expression
of penal philosophy during the interview:
I’ll be honest with you, you know, and I know in sentencing minutes, he said [referring to
the judge] – they [referring to the judge and prosecutor] talked about the death penalty. He
said that you should never be released and his last day in office, he was going to make sure
he wrote to the parole board.
Ex. 1 at 12. Just as in King, the Board’s injection of the sentencing judge and prosecutor’s penal
philosophy into the interview “made quite clear” that the Board believed their “…own personal
attitudes toward the propriety of punishing murder with the death penalty or with life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole had some relevance to the question of how long [

]

should spend in prison.” King v. New York State Div of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 426-429 (1st
Dept. 1993), aff’d, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994). Whether the inappropriate matter originated with a
commissioner, as was the case in King, or with the sentencing judge and prosecutor, as was the
case here, either way a commissioner raised and discussed penal philosophy during the interview
which establishes that the Board determined it was relevant to the parole decision.
This is not a case in which there is no indication the Board considered inappropriate matter
in the parole file; here, the Board’s specific reference to the sentencing court’s recommendation
which espoused penal philosophy establishes that the Board improperly considered penal
philosophy. See e.g. Ex. 11 at 5–6 (Bailey v. Stanford, 53704/2019 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty.
2019)). In Bailey, petitioner’s claim that the Board had considered penal philosophy was denied
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because there was “no indication in the record that the Board referenced or considered the specific
content of the community opposition in rendering its Decision,” and therefore “contrary to the
King case … [petitioner] failed to demonstrate that the Board considered factors outside the scope
of the statute.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, in contrast, the record establishes that the Board
referenced the sentencing judge’s recommendation which conveyed pure penal philosophy. Ex. 1
at 12.
Further, the record indicates the Board was influenced by or placed weight on the penal
philosophy expressed by the sentencing judge. Cf. Duffy v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, 132 A.D.3d 1207, 1209 (3d Dep’t 2015). In Duffy, the Third Department held that
“improper matter” in victim impact statements was not a ground for reversal when there was
“nothing in the Board's decision indicating that it was influenced by, placed weight upon, or relied
upon any improper matter, whether in the victim's family statements or otherwise.” Id. at 1209.
Here, the improper matter at issue is the recommendation of the sentencing judge and prosecutor,
not improper matter contained within victim statements. The difference is significant. The Board
must consider the “recommendations of the sentencing court [and] the district attorney” (emphasis
added). See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i (c)(A). But the Board need only consider a “statement made
to the parole board by the crime victim or the victim’s representative.” Id. Therefore, in Duffy, the
Board was not required to consider recommendations in victim statements that espoused penal
philosophy. Here, the law required the Board to consider the recommendations of the sentencing
judge and prosecutor, which espoused penal philosophy.
Yet, rather than consider and then disavow such recommendations as penal philosophy, the
Board specifically raised the sentencing court and prosecutor’s personal sense of justice during the
interview. This indicates the Board gave weight to the judge and prosecution’s penal philosophy.
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Duffy, 132 A.D.3d at 1209. The Duffy court found there was no need for the Board to disavow
inappropriate content in victim impact statement reasoning that the Legislature anticipated victim
statement would be emotional and contain such content. Cf id. The same reasoning cannot be
applied here wherein the inappropriate content is the sentencing court and prosecutor’s
recommendations. Where the record indicates the Board explicitly invoked inappropriate content
emanating from a judge and prosecutor by referencing it in the interview, absent an explicit
disavowal, the record should be deemed to indicate the Board gave significance and weight to it.
C. Other Sources of Penal Philosophy are Likely Contained in the Parole File
The record establishes that the Board considered, referred to and gave weight to penal
philosophy expressed by the sentencing court and trial prosecutor; this alone requires the denial
decision be annulled, but there is more. According to the Board, there is “significant opposition”
in

parole file. See Ex. 1 at 24. In addition, there are numerous indicators to show

that

file is very likely brimming with penal philosophy. See Petition ¶¶48-53.

Petitioner can more fully argue this pending receipt of the Board’s provision of the record in its
answer. See CPLR 7804-e.
III.

The Parole Board’s Decision Was Predetermined and Thus the Board Did Not
Consider All Relevant Statutory Factors
The Board’s reference to the “high profile” nature of the case and assertion that it is a “high

charged media case,” which it raised in the instant 2020 parole interview, indicates that genuine
consideration of parole was not possible under such intense public and media scrutiny; thus, denial
was inevitable. See Ex. 1 at 7-8.24.

See Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d

22, 27 (1st Dep’t 2016) (granting a de novo based on the Board’s failure to give “genuine
consideration” to the entirety of the petitioner’s case for release). Rather than genuinely consider
whether

should be paroled based on the statutory standards and factors for release
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articulated in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), the Board repeatedly injected the “highly charged”
nature of the case, which indicates there was not even the possibility of parole. See Ex. 1 at 7-8,
24.
Indications that the parole denial was predetermined is a ground for a de novo interview.
See King, 190 A.D.2d at 423 affd. 83 N.Y.2d 788; Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 65
A.D.3d 838 (4th Dep’t 2009) (“We therefore conclude on the record before us that the Parole
Board failed to weigh all of the relevant statutory factors and that there is ‘a strong indication that
the denial of petitioner's application was a foregone conclusion.’”). While the Board’s work is
discretionary in nature, “it is unquestionably the duty of the Board to give fair consideration to
each of the applicable statutory factors as to every person who comes before it…” King, 190
A.D.2d at 423. When the Board predetermines its decision, prior to conducting the parole
interview and deliberating thereafter, it abdicates its duty to consider and weigh all of the relevant
statutory factors. See Johnson 65 A.D.3d at 839. Indeed, “the whole purpose of New York’s
parole system is, at minimum, to hold out ‘the possibility of parole.’” See Coaxum 14 Misc.3d at
669, quoting Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 75 (1980). When the board
fails to provide such a possibility because it has predetermined the outcome of the hearing, a de
novo hearing is warranted. See King, 190 A.D.2d at 435.
To determine whether the Parole Board properly considered the appropriate guidelines and
factors when issuing a parole decision, the Court should evaluate the decision in “the context of
the parole hearing transcript.” See Fraser v. Evans, 109 A.D.3d 913, 914 (2d Dep’t 2013). When
the record demonstrates a failure to consider the appropriate standards, “the courts must intervene.”
See Johnson, 65 A.D.3d at 839; In re Winchell, 32 Misc.3d 1217(A) (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2011)
(“What occurred [at the parole interview] was...willful disobedience to the law. Through its own
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conduct, as reflected in the transcript, it is obvious that before the petitioner even appeared, the
members of this Parole Board had no intention of entertaining even the slightest thought of his
parole.”) A court need not find explicit evidence of predetermination or a prefabricated written
decision to grant a de novo review on these grounds and may grant a new review based on “a
strong indication that the denial of parole is a foregone conclusion that does not comport with
statutory requirements.” Morris v. New York State Dep’t of Cor. & Cnty. Supervision, 40 Misc.3d
226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cnty. 2013).
The Board’s 2020 interview and decision indicates that denial was inevitable due to the
Board’s consideration of the non-statutory, irrelevant, and prejudicial factor of the “high profile”
nature of

case, and all that implies, including the public and political pressures

associated with cases involving the killing of police officers. Transcripts of Mr.
previous parole hearings demonstrate that the Board has considered the public profile of Mr.
’s case ever since he became eligible for parole. See e.g. Ex. 13 at 10 (Board stating “this
case had a tremendous impact on the entire nation”); Ex. 15 at 19 (Board stating “[t]his is an
extremely high-profile case”).
There is no statutory basis for the Board to consider the level of publicity associated with
an individual’s case when determining whether to grant parole. N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(I)(A)
enumerates eight factors which the Board is to consider when determining parole, none of which
include consideration of the level of public and media attention on the crime or the Board’s parole
decision-making. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i)-(viii).
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Notably, seven of eight articulated statutory factors allow for the possibility of change
case is fixed. 3 For example, an

over time, while the high public profile of

individual seeking parole may demonstrate an increasing level of rehabilitation and readiness for
re-entry from review to review. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i)-(iii); see also Mistretta v.
U.S. 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (“[b]oth indeterminate sentencing and parole were based on
concepts of the offender’s possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to
attempt to rehabilitate the inmate and thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal
activity upon his return to society.”). A crime victim, or their representative, may make comments
to the Board that change over time as old wounds heal or intensify. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259i(2)(c)(A)(v). The only factor which is inherently fixed can be found in Executive Law § 259i(2)(c)(A)(viii), which allows the Board to consider the nature of the crime itself. Indeed, the
prospective parolee’s crime remains relevant even decades after its occurrence because it provides
an evaluative reference point against which the Board can make its parole determination. The
level of media coverage a case receives, however, provides no such context to the Board’s
evaluation. When that media coverage remains a constant, as it has in

case, it

serves only to preserve sentiments about what the prospective parolee did in the past and sheds no
light on who he is today relative to the version of himself that committed the crime. When the
Board considers the public profile of a case, it factors in prejudicial, irrelevant, and unchanging
information despite the statute’s structure emphasizing factors which reflect the prospective
parolee’s rehabilitation and readiness to reenter society. Consideration of the public profile of the

3

As discussed infra,
case has always attracted significant media attention. It will likely continue to
due to the law enforcement community and the PBA’s relentless campaign to pressure the Board to deny
parole, in part by ensuring that his parole reviews are covered by major news outlets.
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case is therefore outside of the Board’s statutory dictate and irrelevant in evaluating any of the
eight factors carefully laid out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(i)-(viii).
Yet, the Board repeatedly referred to the high-profile nature of

case in his

parole interviews. In the 2020 parole interview, the Board referred to the public profile of the case
twice. The first such reference occurs near the beginning of the hearing:
: …as you know it’s a political case.
COMMISSIONER COPPOLA: It’s a highly charged media case, there’s no doubt about
that.
Ex. 1 at 7.
Then, near the end of the interview, Commissioner Coppola, unprompted, injects the public
profile of

case. Ex. 1 at 24-29. Critically, he does so while identifying some of

the factors the Board will consider under Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and related
considerations, such as

age:

COMMISSIONER COPPOLA: We all have a bad day. When you go 20 years without
anything, I think that’s a different story. So with that low family support, everything is low
and unlikely. Of course this doesn’t take in other factors with regard to the crime but it
does take in a number of other factors, your age, things like that. Your healthy [sic] might
play a role in there. I’m trying to cover the areas that I wanted to cover. Again, there are—
you’re not the only one but there are other cases that whether they’re high profile or not.
Your case is what we would consider for lack of a better term high profile and this is not a
secret. You have support for your release and significant opposition.
: I understand that.
COMMISSIONER COPPOLA: It’s never been a secret for you…
Ex. 1 at 24. This exchange indicates that the Board improperly distinguishes high profile cases
from others and implies that the Board is permitted or compelled to do so. There is no basis, in
statute or caselaw, for such consideration.

15
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The Board’s attention to the high-profile nature of the parole decision was a central factor
at

initial parole review and subsequent reviews. In 2012, the Board noted the

widespread attention

case received:

COMMISSIONER ELOVICH: Now, in addition to the family, there is also a tremendous
amount of opposition from law enforcement who felt a tremendous amount of loss, not
only in the City of New York at the time, but across the entire nation. This was the most
highly attended funeral for a police officer in the whole nation. People came to this funeral
from other countries, all ethe elected officials were there, community members, people
from local elementary schools, this case had a tremendous impact on the entire nation, and
still from the letters of opposition continues to have a tremendous impact on law
enforcement and many members of New York City, including all of the officials who
remember this case and the way that it completely shocked and terrified members of the
community.
Ex. 13 at 10.
In 2017, the Board returned to the subject of the “extremely high profile” nature of
’s case. Ex. 15 at 19. The Board’s concerns about the “extremely high profile” nature
of

case and law enforcement’s opposition to his parole are captured in the

following exchange:
COMMISSIONER BERLINER: Let’s say we parole you and you go back to the
community,
right?
: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER BERLINER: This is an extremely high-profile case.
: Yes.
COMMISSIONER BERLINER: Regardless of what happens with your judicial appeal
process and your maintenance of innocence.
: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER BERLINER: It’s not a secret that the police department is absolutely
opposed to the release of anybody who is convicted of killing a cop.
: I understand.
COMMISSIONER BERLINER: So we talked about your plan to go back to the
community. We talked about your readiness to go back to the community, but I want to
get a sense from you of your confidence level of being able to integrate back into a
community that seems like it might be incredibly hostile to you.
Ex. 15 at 19.
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case always has been, and will likely continue to be “high profile;”
thus, the Board’s decisions will continue to be predetermined so long as the Board improperly
considers this factor in its assessment of his eligibility for parole. When the Board injects media
attention to signal how impossible it would be for the Board to grant parole, denial becomes a
“foregone conclusion that does not comport with statutory requirements.” Morris v. New York
State Dep’t of Cor. & Cnty. Supervision, 40 Misc.3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Cnty. 2013). And,
while the Police Benevolent Association (“PBA”) has directly pressured the Board “to make sure
that

merciless assassins leave prison only in coffins,” the Board’s mandate is to

genuinely consider the factors and standards articulated in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and
genuinely consider the possibility of granting parole. 4 Because that was not done here, and the
Board has predetermined that this case is too “high profile” and too much of a “highly charged
media case” to grant parole, a de novo hearing in front of a different panel is warranted. See King,
190 A.D.2d at 435; see also Ex. 1 at 7, 24.
IV.

Commissioner Smith’s Personal Views Indicate that He Abdicated his
Responsibility to Fairly Consider
Release to Parole Supervision
In King, the Court of Appeals found that a single commissioner’s “own personal attitudes”

alone were enough to render the decision improper.

See, King, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 251

(“Commissioner Burke's remarks made quite clear his belief that his own personal attitudes toward
the propriety of punishing murder with the death penalty or with life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole had some relevance to the question of how long petitioner should spend in
prison. … Since neither the death penalty nor life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

4

PBA: No Mercy For
’s Killers, QUEENS CHRONICLE (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.qchron.com/editions/queenswide/pba-no-mercy-for
-s-killers/article 74730f5b-83ce-5875-ab065088b699176f.html.
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are part of the law of this state, they should clearly not have entered into the Board's
consideration.”). See also Rabenbauer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 46 Misc.
3d 603 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2014) (“There is no additional rationale, other than the Board's
opinion of the heinous nature of the instant offense, and personal beliefs and speculations, to justify
the denial of parole release.”). Commissioner Smith’s known political ties and past voting record
evince a personal belief that no person convicted of killing a police officer should ever be released
from prison.
Commissioner Smith’s ties to politicians who support the death penalty and life without
parole is strong. Commissioner Smith, who recently left the Board, was the longest serving
Commissioner on the Parole Board at the time of

hearing. He was appointed by

Governor Pataki in 1996. 5 Governor Pataki campaigned on a promise to reinstate the death
penalty, and three months after taking office, signed legislation authorizing the death penalty and
life without parole. 6 In addition, Commissioner Smith has strong ties to state Senator Patrick
Gallivan who opposes the release of people convicted of killing police officers. Before becoming
a state senator, Senator Gallivan was also appointed to the Parole Board by Governor Pataki and
served on the Board with Mr. Smith for many years. Commissioner Smith has consistently
supported the candidacy of Senator Gallivan who, as the former chair and current member of the
Crime Victims, Crime, and Correction Committee in the Senate, 7 has amplified his opposition to

5

Josefa Velasquez, State Senate Approves Parole Board Nominees, N.Y. L. J. (June 22, 2017),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/newyorklawjournal/2017/06/22/state-senate-approves-parole-boardnominees/
6
Michael Lumer & Nancy Tenney, The Death Penalty in New York: An Historical Perspective, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 81, 81
(1995).
7
See About, https://www.nysenate.gov/ senators/patrick-m-gallivan/about.
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parole for “cop killers,” by donating to Senator Gallivan’s election and reelection campaigns at
least eight times since 2010. 8
Senator Gallivan has been an outspoken critic of granting parole to those convicted of
murdering police officers, demonstrated by multiple campaigns opposing the release of so-called
“cop killers.” When

—who was convicted of killing two police officers—was

released on parole, Sen. Gallivan sent a letter to the Governor questioning the Board’s decision
and requesting an investigation into the Board’s decision-making practices. See Patrick M.
Gallivan,

Letter

to

Governor

Andrew

M.

Cuomo,

July

29, 2019,

available

at

https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/pressrelease/attachment/gallivan_parole_letter_2019.pdf. 9 The senator also rallied against the release
of

, who, in 1971 at age 19, killed a police officer and had served over 45 years

on a 25 to life sentence. 10 In 2018, the first link on Senator Gallivan's homepage read “No Parole
for

” See “New York State Parole Board: Failures in Staffing and Performance”

at n.20, and accompanying text, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pp/9. Senator Gallivan expressed
the same position in a series of press conferences urging the Parole Board to deny parole to
. He presented a petition to the Board “signed by nearly 10,000 concerned citizens” urging
them “to deny the release from prison of

, the driver of a getaway car in a 1981 robbery

of a Brink’s armored car in Rockland County, N.Y. The robbery left a security guard and two

8

See New York State Board of Elections Campaign Finance Disclosure Database,
https://publicreporting.elections.ny.gov/Contributions/ Contributions (indicating donations by Mr. Smith to
“Gallivan for Senate” in 2010, 2012, 2017, 2018, and three times in 2019).
9
See, also, Maria Enea, Senate Republicans Demand Cop Killer Stay in Jail, THE LEGISLATIVE GAZETTE, (Feb. 8,
2018), https://legislativegazette.com/senate-republicans-demand-cop-killer-stays-in-jail/; Rick Karlin, GOP
Senators, Police Unions Oppose Cop Killer Parole, TIMES UNION (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/GOP-Senators-police-unions-oppose-cop-killer-12537368.php.
10
Press Release, Senator Gallivan Calls On Parole Board to Deny Parole for Convicted Cop Killer,
https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/patrick-m-gallivan/senator-gallivan-calls-parole-board-denyparole-convitced.
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Senator Gallivan keeps a close watch on the Board’s decisions,

particularly those in the cases of so-called “cop killers.” Just this past June, he noted that “[s]ince
2017, the state Parole Board has released at least 20 cop-killers.” 12 Commissioner Smith’s
sustained support for a politician who continuously fights to block the release of “cop-killers”
suggests that he supports that political position as well.
Commissioner Smith’s conduct as a commissioner also suggests his personal attitude
towards those convicted of killing police officers. Although only the Board can answer this
question, upon information and belief, Commissioner Smith has never voted to grant parole to a
person convicted of killing a police officer. 13
The following parole decision illustrates former Commissioner Smith’s steadfast refusal to
grant parole in cases involving the death of a police officer.

, convicted of killing a

police officer and a civilian when he was eighteen years old, was denied parole five times and
served over 40 years. Ex. 16 at 2–3 (Voii). In 2020, at a court-ordered de novo review (Ex. 16),
two commissioners on a three-commissioner panel voted to release

11

, noting that “[t]he

Patrick Gallivan, Senator Gallivan Presents Petition Calling on NYS Board of Parole to Deny Release of
, 29 March 2018, https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/patrick-m-gallivan/senator-gallivanpresents-petition-calling-nys-board. See also Patrick Gallivan, Senator Gallivan Issues Statement on Parole of
https://www nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/patrick-m-gallivan/senator-gallivan-issues-statementparole(“The Parole Board’s decision to release convicted cop killer
is an affront to lawabiding citizens and to the families of her victims. Time does not diminish the seriousness of her crime or the lack of
respect she showed for law enforcement and the rules of society that the rest of us follow.”).
12
Patrick Gallivan, Senator Gallivan Joins Colleagues in Unveiling Parole Reform Bills,
https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/patrick-m-gallivan/senator-gallivan-joins-colleagues-unveilingparole-reform
13
See, e.g., “Parole Interview Transcript/Decision - FUSL000002 (2015-10-20)" (2019). Parole Information Project
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/trans/6 (denying parole for man convicted of murdering a police officer); "Parole
Interview Transcript/Decision - FUSL000069 (2015-12-15)" (2021). Parole Information Project
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/trans/102 (same); "Parole Interview Transcript/Decision - FUSL000069 (2016-07-28)"
(2021). Parole Information Project https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/trans/103 (Commissioner Smith reads into the record
at the interview the words of the sentencing judge: “There probably is no crime in our society that society condemns
more than the killing of a policeman in the performance of his duties.”); "Parole Interview Transcript/Decision FUSL000077 (2012-05-16)" (2021). Parole Information Project https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/trans/118 (denial of
man convicted of murder and attempted murder of a police officer).
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opposition of your release was duly considered” but nevertheless granted parole “[b]ased on the
legal standards this panel must apply.” Ex. 12 at 81–82. Yet, Commissioner Smith dissented
stating, “[t]he senseless deaths of the two men you shot and killed continue to impact the victims’
family, friends and the community.” Id. at 83. Despite two Commissioners determining that the
“legal standards” required a grant of parole, Commissioner Smith refused to apply such legal
standards.
Commissioner Smith’s refusal to consider parole for those convicted of killing police
officers is starkly illustrated by his participation in the last two denials of parole to
, each violating a court order.

, convicted of murdering a police

officer, successfully appealed a 2014 denial of parole, with the court finding the Board had relied
exclusively on the severity of the offense. See Mackenzie v. Stanford, No. 2789/2015, 2015 WL
13872810, at 3 (Sup. Ct., Dutchess Cnty, 2015) (“A parole board is not entitled to exclusively rely
on the severity of an offense to deny parole, as such a determination contravenes the discretionary
scheme mandated by statute and constitutes an unauthorized re-sentencing of the defendant.”).
The court ordered a de novo review in compliance with the law.
Yet, at the 2015 de novo appearance, the panel, which included Commissioner Smith,
issued a denial decision almost identical to the one from 2014. Ex. 22 at 1. In response, the court
held the Board in contempt finding that the Board had once again denied parole based solely on
the nature of the crime. See MacKenzie v. Stanford, No. 2789/2015, 2016 WL 11690588, at 3
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty, 2016), aff’d, Ferrante v. Stanford, 172 A.D.3d 31 (2d Dept 2019) (“…we
agree with the Supreme Court’s conclusion, made after a hearing, that the record in this particular
case demonstrates that the Board again denied parole release exclusively on the basis of the
underlying conviction without having given genuine consideration to the statutory factors.”)
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(citations omitted). The court ordered another de novo review and that “none of the members of
either the 2014 or 2015 parole boards that denied parole shall participate in the de novo hearing.”
MacKenzie, No. 2789/2015 at *3.
In direct contravention of the court’s order, Commissioner Smith sat as lead on the second
de novo review in 2016. Ex. 21 at 1. And, then, also in direct violation of the court’s contempt
order, Commissioner Smith denied again based solely on the nature of the crime. Id. at 31 (“This
panel remains concerned about your violent conduct in the instant offenses, shooting and killing a
uniformed police officer, reflecting a callous indifference to human life, your history of negative
behavior and your willingness to transport guns over state lines. You have demonstrated a
willingness to place your own self-interest above those of society.”).

Ten days later, Mr.

, then 70 years old, was found dead by suicide. 14
Even after being held in contempt and likely to have been held in contempt again had Mr.
not died by suicide, Commissioner Smith was not deterred from denying Mr.
’s release based solely on the nature of the crime.
Commissioner Smith’s strongly held beliefs regarding police victims—which he has every
right to—have, however, caused him to abdicate his responsibility to fairly consider all relevant
factors. King, 190 A.D.2d at 432 (“[t]he role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner
according to the personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for murder, but to
determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, he should be
released.”); see also Coaxum v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 827 N.Y.S.2d 489, 497 (Sup. Ct.
2006) (“the Board's conclusion is thus nothing more than its disagreement with the court's

14

See Jesse Wegman, False Hope and a Needless Death Behind Bars, N.Y. Times (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://perma.cc/45ZD-JMTUl; see also Richard Rivera, Traumatized to Death: The Cumulative Effects of Serial
Parole Denials, 23 CUNY L. REV. F. 25 (2020).
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sentence”). Here, former Commissioner Smith based his decision on his own personal belief as to
the sentence

deserved.

This is precisely what the King Court condemned.

Accordingly, a de novo hearing should be granted.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons,

respectfully requests that this Court grant the petition and

order Respondents to hold a de novo parole interview before Commissioners who did not
participate in the November 2020 denial decision or its administrative affirmance, that such review
be held within thirty days of entry of the order, and that parole be considered consistent with this
Court’s decision.
Dated: New York, New York
December 13, 2021

______________________
Martha Rayner, Esq.
Clinical Associate Professor of law
mrayner@lsls.fordham.edu
Lincoln Square Legal Services
Fordham University School of Law
150 West 62nd Street, 9th Floor
New York, New York 10023
(212) 636-6934
On the Memorandum:
Dean Corrado
Eli Salamon-Abrams
Isabel Zeitz-Moskin
Legal Interns
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STATEMENT PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.8-B
I, Martha Rayner, affirm under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106, that the total
number of words in the foregoing Memorandum of Law, inclusive of point headings and
footnotes and exclusive of pages containing the caption, table of contents, table of authorities,
and signature block, is 6945 words. The foregoing Memorandum of Law complies with the word
count limit set forth in 22 NYCRR 202.8-b. In determining the number of words in the foregoing
Memorandum of Law, I relied upon the word count of the word-processing system used to
prepare the document.

/s/ Martha Rayner_______________
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Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc.
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